














This chapter studies the flow of funds and financial resilience of the banking 
industry in the Balkans in the face of the global financial crisis and the second 
great depression. After presenting the stylized facts in terms of standard variables 
like deposit potential, credit activity, capital adequacy, NPLs and basic 
profitability indicators in the last couple of years immediately preceding and 
following the beginning of the crisis, we go on to review the theoretical 
paradigms and empirical regularities found in (international) banking crises 
literature, only to make preliminary evaluation of robustness of the narrow 
banking model in the Balkans and effectiveness of deposit insurance schemes for 
the health of banking sectors and overall growth financing, and lastly but not 
least, in order to establish the likelihood, feasible channels and type of potentially 
systemic banking crisis occurrence after all in otherwise fairly narrowly 
organised banking industry of the region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Back in the 1990s, banking industry of transition countries in Balkans had 
undergone dramatic changes pushed by foreign banks competition and in 
accordance with the fashion of the time - privatisation, liberalisation and 
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international standardisation [Fang et alia, 2011]. Even though political conflicts 
delayed the transition process of SEE banks, just as institutional decoupling of 
(mostly politically orchestrated) banks’ state owned corporate claims from their 
net worth accelerated it – at the expense of fairly low sale prices in takeovers of 
local banks initiated from abroad, with the political pacification of the whole 
region, fast and robust growth took place in recent pre-crisis history [Backe-
Wojcik, 2008]. In parallel with the growth of banking sector in small open 
economies in transition, the average share of emerging markets’ banking sector 
assets held by foreign banks rose from 21 percent in 1995 to 38 percent in 2005 
[Claessens et alia, 2008].  
 
The onset of global financial meltdown supplemented by the fall of Lehman 
Brothers brought about jitters of illiquidity and turned the tables on the 
international financial markets. However, “Vienna Agreement” pressed the brake 
pedal on chaotic capital outflows from Balkans banking sectors, and therefore 
softened the inevitable financial landing that followed. Nevertheless, protracted 
recession and dark clouds gathering over the common European currency, 
Eurozone’s economy and its national banking sectors reinforced tremendous 
pressures on economies, businesses and entrepreneurs in the Balkans, thereby 
threatening the sustainability of both bank sources of finance and their 
outstanding claims in the region. Balkan banks’ capitalization, reserve 
requirements and alike reservations remain superior to their E (M) U banking 
counterparts, and yet, fragility of certain macroeconomic relationships could still 
prove to be a clear if not already present danger for the health of banking system. 
In contrast, national economies and business standards in the Balkans are at 
subpar with those achieved and maintained in the E (M) U, hence too narrow a 
banking may not be the best strategic model for propelling the underlying 
economies, respectively, and without the sound underlying assets and/or 
collateral, as we learned only too graphically from the recent subprime crisis, no 
banking system can ever hope to thrive. 
 
Objectives of this chapter are to recapitulate the average anatomy of banking 
sectors in the selected countries in the Balkans (Southeast Europe), identify the 
impact and propagation channels of global financial crisis onto banking industry 
in the region, review the theoretical paradigms and empirical regularities of 
(international) banking crises literature and lastly, but not least, establish the 
likelihood, feasible channels and type of potentially systemic banking crisis in 
narrowly organised banking of the Balkans. 
566 Chapter 29.  
ANATOMY OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN BALKANS AND 
PRELIMINARY IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Banking industry in Balkans is still in transitional, developing stage. Lack of 
innovation and overall orientation towards pretty much narrow banking with firm 
roots in retail business could be attributed to the following traits: shallow and 
often deliberately underdeveloped financial markets, political, economic and 
especially corporate credit risk in those countries, high poverty rate, exchange rate 
volatility, steep or even hyper-inflation episodes and moody international finance 
of the region as evident in worrisome balance of payments deficits, chronically 
high public debt record, as well as skittish inbound FDI dynamics.  
 
Track record of successful transition countries indicates that once fundamentally 
stable, robust and reliable banking sector had been formed, it typically gave way 
to- and even reinforced development of outer and more sophisticated layers of 
financial system, namely in segments of insurance companies and their products, 
pension funds and other institutional investors. That said, despite impressive and 
accelerated genesis of banking industry in Balkans, with contemporary rules, 
standards and regulations in place, national banking sectors in the region in 
comparison to EU let alone US remain underdeveloped, underutilised, 
unsophisticated and occasionally unstable. Along the same lines, unlike in the EU 
and the US where -due to new products and new intermediaries propulsion- one 
can detect a decrease of banking sector market share [Mishkin-Eakins, 2000], 
transition economies are characterised by domination of the banking sector most 
obvious through the balance sheet aggregate of banks in the financial system total. 
Thus, bank loans quickly became widely accepted and thriving funding source in 
the region, winning predominance in the pre-crisis years due to easily accessible 
loans through foreign-owned subsidiaries at reasonable rates throughout the boom 
segment of the credit cycle, which made many companies' business models and 
some household budgets crucially dependant on such cash infusions. The 
bitterness of this dependency appeared all too clearly at the beginning of the 
crisis, when banks abandoned their previous positive loan policy and adopted 
credit constraints. The direct consequence of this was an apparent credit crunch 
and a serious slow-down in growth [Valova et alia, 2010]. 
 
As we know by now, international financial meltdown and global recession that 
ensued originated from the US real estate bubble and subsequently spread over to 
other markets and European continent via fancy asset-backed derivative mutants 
and thanks to worrisome absence of financial transparency of institutional 
investors' portfolios. First visible signs of financial and economic overhang hit the 
Balkans with understandable time lag, in terms of deteriorating liquidity and 
slowdown of reforms in banking and financial sector [Unicredit, 2011]. Even 
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though global financial crisis symptoms became apparent in the Balkans banking 
industry no sooner than the end of 2008 early 2009, cross-border loans and 
portfolio investment went up in smoke almost immediately, primarily in order to 
provide for losses incurred elsewhere, and arguably only in late 2010 and beyond 
shrinkage of Balkan banks' balance sheets could be linked with the proverbial 
«flight to safety» and firesale considerations. Interest rate hikes, i.e. interest 
spread over Balkan central banks' reference rates applied to yield the commercial 
cost of lending by the Balkan banking industry (as well as for interbank 
borrowing), were among the very first messengers of international financial 
contagion reaching the shores of the peninsula. Commercial banks in the Balkans 
attempted to mitigate the negative consequences of the first wave of the crisis by 
more restrictive credit analysis and more cautious loan policy, stricter 
classification of loans outstanding, rising capital adequacy ratios and much more 
careful daily and overall liquidity management throughout 2009. 
 
Credit crunch is usually defined as a sudden sharp reduction in the availability of 
money or credit from banks and other lenders. However, identifying the 
macroeconomic effects of credit supply disruptions is difficult because many of 
the same factors that influence the supply of bank loans can also affect the 
demand for credit [Bassett et alia, 2012]. Therefore, we shall take a bit closer 
look at the development anatomy of the selected national banking sectors in 
Balkans, before we proceed to the theory of banking crises and analyse feasible 
relevance and applicability of that theory to the contemporary reality of fund 
flows and systemic risk management in the Balkan banking industry. 
 
In regard to the number of banks and their share in total assets (see Table 1), 
roughly 70% of Balkans banking assets is held by foreign-owned banks operating 
across the region [Barjaktarovic-Paunovic, 2011], with the largest number of 
foreign subsidiaries in Romania (42) and smallest in Macedonia (18). Most of the 
foreign banks are based in neighbouring European countries, notably in Austria, 
Italy, Greece, and in some of the countries originating from France, Russia or 
Turkey. In Serbia and Croatia, there is still a distinct presence of domestic banks 
among the top five. Notwithstanding the national specificities, thus far, the crisis 
hasn’t dramatically altered either the number of banks or the ownership structure 
in the banking sectors of the region [Raiffeisen, 2012].  
 
Similarly, important and often consulted indicators are total committed assets as 
well as capital adequacy ratios of banks at hand. After impressive growth during 
the credit boom years up until early 2007, several banking sectors in Balkans 
reached as much as 90% share in the aggregate financial portfolios of their 
respective countries, with the peak in assets growth in 2006, after which most 
banking sectors’ assets continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace. By 2009, asset 
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dynamics becomes stagnant even in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary (whose 
assets robustly grew in spite of the global financial crisis up until 2009), while 
Montenegro’s and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s banking industry exhibits a marked 
shrinkage of their aggregated balance sheets. Interestingly, until the end of 2009 
all banking sectors in the Balkans kept their assets-to-GDP ratios above 50%, 
while Hungarian, Bulgarian and Croatian banking sectors through that first 
seriously recessionary year for the region maintained their aggregate assets 30%, 
14% and 7% above their annual GDPs, respectively. On the other hand, the 
lowest asset-to-GDP ratios in 2009 were recorded in Romanian, Serbian and 
Bosnian banking sectors (74%, 82% and 86%, respectively). In terms of capital 
adequacy ratios (see Tables 2 and 3), the biggest ratio in the period considered 
had been recorded in Serbia 23.6% in 2008, and the lowest in Montenegro 8%, 
back in 2007. By and large, therefore, banking industry in Balkans has much 
higher capital-adequacy ratios, i.e. lower leverage than recorded in the E (M) U or 
required by the incoming Basel 3 regulations. Bar far the highest among the 
impressive capital adequacy ratios of Balkan banking industry have been recorded 
in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia. 
 
In terms of credit/deposit potential (see Table 4), once the financial bust kicked 
in, countries with the biggest and the lowest credit growth in the boom part of the 
cycle recorded the largest drop in available loan funds from 2009 onwards 
(Hungary and Montenegro, respectively). Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had faced stagnation of their deposit potential in 2008, while others 
managed to maintain positive but slower trend. The year 2009 marked a mild 
recovery in deposit potential of Balkans banking industry (with the exception of 
Montenegro which didn't recover), whereas Serbia even managed to achieve a 
two digit yearly growth of deposit potential (14.2%). According to data shown in 
Table 5, from 2005-2009 loans outstanding-to-GDP ratios of all analysed banking 
sectors had gradually risen, never falling below 30% (apart from very briefly in 
Serbia and Romania at the beginning of the period). Greatest rise of loan-to-GDP 
ratio was documented in Bulgaria (79%) and Croatia (78%), arguably propped up 
by the recession itself, but also by strengthened confidence in pushed up 
guarantees under deposit insurance schemes, as well as by rapid decline of other 
sources of finance (Bulgaria and Croatia suffered the greatest fall in FDI inflows 
in 2009, in both absolute and relative terms). However, these are the countries 
whose depositors exhibited the greatest confidence in their banking sectors by 
increasing the amount of deposits as a % of their GDP (65% and 76% 
respectively). Nevertheless, towards the end of 2008 many of the Balkan 
countries experienced an absolute decline in credit lending, which deteriorated 
further in the beginning of 2009. In the end of 2009 in almost all Balkan countries 
credit lending was brought to a temporary hault [Valova et alia, 2010], which 
took better part of 2010 as well. In the second half of 2010 and through 2011, 
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deposit potential and credit activity picked up, albeit to a pretty diverse extent 
across the selected banking sectors in the region (see Figure 2). On a top of it, 
predominantly corporate deposit surge in several Balkan banking sectors probably 
represents a double-edged sword, because it reflects domestic corporate 
reluctance to invest (instead of which they deposit excess cash reserves) which 
will diminish economic growth and overall repayment capacities of those 
economies in the nearer future [Raiffeisen, 2012]. One thing is for sure: 2010 and 
2011 credit growth recovery after the sharp drop in 2009 took place at rates well 
below those recorded in the Balkans banking sectors before the crisis [The World 
Bank, 2011]. The expected lower availability of external financing suggests that 
deposits will retain the attractiveness they gained in the Balkans over the last 
decade or so [Raiffeisen, 2011]. Currently, loan growth is losing momentum in 
the Balkans, but still remains somewhat above the average nominal growth of 
economic activity (see Table 5) in countries at hand, respectively [Raiffeisen, 
2012]. 
 
Be that as it may, the global financial crisis and especially Eurozone's banks' 
exposure to sky-rocketing sovereign debt have more recently diverted attention to 
likelihood and ability of financial intermediaries to sustain and weather sudden 
losses or capital outflows and alike liquidity shocks, quite regardless of current 
satisfactory standing or the mild credit growth recovery. Imperative of improving 
risk management practices and developing new methodologies of early warning 
systems has resulted in mandatory deployment of the so-called stress-testing 
under Basel 2 (and even more so in the pipeline of Basel 3) standards. Stress 
testing quickly became a preferred toolset for real-time simulations of 
systemically disastrous scenarios and detection of robustness or lack thereof of 
banks' balance sheets and their operating procedures. Table 6 reminds us that 
stress-testing was implemented relatively late in the game across the Balkans, 
while circumstantial evidence indicates that utilisation of state of the art 
techniques to that end in some (mostly domestic) banks is still fairly scarce. 
Quarterly stress-testing is being carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Montenegro, semi-annual in Croatia, Hungary and Romania, 
while Serbia legally sticks to the once a year rule [Malecky-Podpiera, 2010]. With 
the notable exceptions of Macedonia and Serbia, before the crisis, despite robust 
credit growth conservative banking practices and traditional products secured that 
NPLs across the region remained under 6,3% (see Table 7). Initially, more 
frequent stress-testing even in such a well-capitalised banking sectors proved to 
be highly desirable, since with the escalation of global financial contagion in 
Balkans there was a rapid increase in non-performing loans (henceforth NPLs) in 
virtually all of the countries from the region [The World Bank, 2011]. 
Understandably, in the run-up to the crisis a high degree of dollarization, elevated 
external debt, and robust credit growth tested the banks’ capacities to underwrite 
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loans prudently and maintain adequate capital and liquidity buffers [Cocozza et 
alia, 2011]. By the mid 2011 several national banking sectors stabilized their NPL 
trends, whereas Hungary, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia banking sectors 
continued to struggle, groggy from the second wave of Eurozone crisis, 
characterized by persistent recession, illiquid corporate sector, arrears and flight 
to quality withdrawals by households and overall panic-striking cracks visible in 
banking systems and financial markets of the E (M) U member countries. 
 
Nevertheless, with a very few notable exceptions (e.g. Agrobanka), banks in the 
region remained liquid while their profitability that ranges from reasonable to 
above European average even (see Figure 4), mostly utilising retail maintenance 
(deposit-related) fees, with just a few loss-making outliers (e.g. Erste bank). Be 
that as it may, one caveat seems appropriate: in coping with the NPLs as well as 
capital flow reversals and overall recessionary trends, many banking sectors in the 
region (and / or their national governments) grew slightly worrying financing 
gaps: should crisis go on worsening for another while, they would most probably 
require either the IMF involvement, heftier remittances injection, or a more 
committed concerted lending effort by their parent banks from overseas.  
THEORETICAL PARADIGMS AND EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 
FROM THE (INTERNATIONAL) BANKING CRISES LITERATURE 
Flashing back into the 20th century, from the break-up of Bretton-Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates onwards, and along with the liberalisation of international 
capital movement, banking crises as a subset of financial crises have become a 
globally spread out phenomenon [Mishkin, 1997]. Thus, in the 1980-1998 period, 
133 countries or almost ¾ of IMF members experienced serious banking sector 
disruptions [Malovic, 2006]. In the US only, during 1980-1996 interval more than 
5000 banks went bankrupt, which was equivalent to 920 billion $ of losses plus 
192 billion $ restructuring injections where deemed possible. In developing and 
transition countries aggregate losses and restructuring costs of banking crises in 
the last two decades of 20th century amount to 250 billion $ [Barth et alia, 1998]. 
In relative terms, i.e. as a fraction of their respective GDPs, the hardest losses 
among the industrial countries hit Spain (17%, during 1977-1985 crisis), followed 
by Finland (8%, 1991-1993), Sweden (6%, 1991), Norway (4%, 1987-1989) 
[Goldstein-Turner, 1996]. Once again, developing and small open economies in 
transition experienced with stronger contagion elements and more drastic 
spillover effects: Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) found that more than 10 countries 
sustained losses of over 10% of GDP, while Argentina, Chile and Ivory Coast 
over 25%, coupled with extreme balance of payments disequilibria and external 
debt spiralling out of control.  
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Next, until very recently, new millennium brought about great moderation in 
terms of systemic banking sector crisis too, and a widespread belief -that at least 
for the advanced economies, if not for the entire world after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, destabilizing, systemic international banking crises became a relic of the 
past- took hold [Reinhart-Rogoff, 2009]. Once a perfect storm mixture of the 
global financial meltdown and the second great depression engulfed primarily the 
developed world, we had quite another thing coming. In discerning why 
recessions associated with financial contagion and international banking crises are 
so costly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p.145) find that banking crises are more 
often an amplification mechanism rather than underlying cause of depression, 
since “(…) a reversal of fortunes in output growth leads to a string of defaults on 
bank loans, forcing a pullback in other bank lending, which leads to further output 
falls and repayment problems, and so on.” 
 
However, although both developed and developing countries’ banking sectors 
may be equally susceptible to banking crises nowadays, that may still be for 
different reasons, through different channels and of different making, hence more 
detailed analysis of theoretical paradigms as well as empirical regularities from 
the (international) banking crises literature may be in order. Malovic (2006) 
identified four fundamental subsets of banking crises determinants: 1) 
macroeconomic instability, 2) too swift a liberalisation of international capital 
flows, 3) microeconomic weaknesses of domestic banking and bad risk 
management and 4) flawed legal, accounting and regulatory framework for 
banking sector supervision.  
 
In addition, macroeconomic instability can stem from external and/or domestic 
volatility. External vulnerability of banks is typically dominated by the trio: terms 
of trade dynamic, real effective exchange rate dynamics and world (reference) 
interest rates. It goes without saying that abrupt and non-negligible deterioration 
in the terms of trade presents formidable obstacles for banks’ debtors to service 
their loans back to their bank on time. Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) found that 
75% of their sample (sample is made of 86 countries that experienced banking 
crises from late 1970s to 1996) sustained at least 10% deterioration in the terms of 
trade a year ahead of the banking crisis (the average terms of trade worsening in 
the subsample was 17%). This vulnerability channel seems to be especially 
important for countries with high goods- and geographical concentration of 
exports [Goldstein-Turner, 1996]. When it comes to exchange rate effect, FX risk 
management endangers banks directly via balance sheet effects of the foreign 
currency denominated subset of assets and liabilities, and indirectly through 
exposure and subsequently adverse repayment capacity consequences for their 
debtors. However, empirical results tend to be more mixed than immediately 
suspected. Namely, Eichengreen and Rose (2001), for instance, failed to identify 
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any statistically significant causality between different exchange rate regimes and 
incidents of banking crises. Nonetheless, that may well be due to the fact that 
often times indeed, “(…) country’s declared exchange rate arrangement is a poor 
proxy for the actual stability of its exchange rate [Eichengreen-Rose, 2001, 
p.192]. Hence Mendis (2002), after applying a logit model to panel data on 
banking crises over 1970-1992 horizon, econometrically proves that banking 
sectors of countries with flexible exchange rate regimes markedly increase their 
resistance to external shocks and probability to fall pray of systemic banking 
crisis. And yet, within the realm of contemporarily predominant floating 
exchange rate regimes, growing body of literature underscores original sin 
arguments of currency mismatch for both the banks and their clients a la G. Calvo 
and R. Hausmann type of depreciation arguments [Razin-Sadka, 2001], whereas 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001), and Von Hagen and Ho (2003), for instance, 
indicate real appreciation of national currency as a prime suspect and standard 
early warning indicator of banking crises. The third external determinant (among 
the macroeconomic instability subset) of banking crises is dynamics of leading 
reference interest rates (e.g. LIBOR, EURIBOR, Prime Rate etc.), because 
interest rates at chief international financial markets not only reflect banks’ and/or 
large corporations’ borrowing costs, but also indirectly reflect relative 
attractiveness of investing in emerging markets. As a matter of fact, empirical 
studies suggest that reference rate movements can explain between ½ and 1/3 of 
sudden stops in capital inflows in small open developing economies throughout 
1990s [Calvo, 1998*], [Calvo-Reinhart, 2000], [Eichengreen-Rose, 2001]. As to 
domestic sources of macroeconomic instability, oscillation in real economic 
activity (due to ill-conceived or irresponsible fiscal & monetary mix and labour 
market distortions) and non-anticipated inflation are the usual suspects. However, 
the aforementioned macroeconomic- corollaries-of-credit-crunch caveat is still 
binding here: although Goldstein and Turner (1996) give dozens of historical 
examples of how bank insolvencies, bankruptcies and domino-illiquidity give rise 
to negative externalities in the real economy, Gorton (1988) empirically 
demonstrated that opposite is also true – namely that recessions give way to 
banking crises. Unanticipated inflation effect exhibits somewhat different impact 
on banking sectors in developed versus developing countries. In low inflation 
industrial countries, most of credit contracts are characterized by long duration 
which is why unanticipated disinflation (or deflation) bites into the net worth of 
corporate sector, while in high and volatile inflation developing countries credit 
contracts are typically characterized by variable (indexed) interest rates and short 
durations, thereby exerting non-negative or even positive effect of unanticipated 
deflation on net worth of corporate sector and thus their national banking sectors 
[Mishkin, 1997]. Additionally, political unrest, irresponsible monetary and 
supervisory policies have also fairly predictable effect on incidence of banking 
crises. In reviewing several rigorous, comprehensive and influential econometric 
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studies, Malovic (2006) corroborates that low and staggering real rate of growth, 
high and volatile inflation as well as high ex post (or low ex ante) interest rates 
are main determinants and stable indicators of banking crises. Interestingly 
enough, Eichengreen’s and Rose’s (2001, p.190) econometric results point with 
some statistical significance at budget surpluses as being predecessors of banking 
crises!  
 
The second subset of banking crises determinants, capital flow bonanzas promted 
by too hasty financial liberalisation, could be traced in theoretical contribution of 
H. Minsky and C. Kindleberger, wherein crisis are caused by imported deposit 
and inescapably credit euphoria fed by the upswing of the credit cycle 
[Kindleberger, 2000], [Kyotaki-Moore, 2004]. As soon as business and credit 
cycle swings down, either financial asset bubble („overcapacity bubble“) becomes 
apparent and subsequently bursts, or due to exogenous capital flow reversals, 
bank illiquidity and runs kick in [Reinhart-Rogoff, 2009]. Speculative bubble, 
then, could stem either from unrealistically inflated real estate prices [Ventura, 
2002], stock market exuberance [Barbarino-Jovanovic, 2003], systematic 
overvaluation of national currency or the currency domestic one is pegged against 
[Corsseti-Pesenti-Roubini, 1999], overexposure of banking and/or corporate 
sector [Dornbusch, 2003], or exploding external sovereign debt due to (in)formal 
government guarantees extended to local provinces and influential state-owned 
enterprises [Malovic, 2006]. These boom-bust cycles are very well explored in the 
banking crisis literature, trouble is, in practice it is very hard to differentiate 
between triple A and exceedingly risky borrowers during the upswing, just as 
months and years of building up problematic Ponzi-like balance sheet positions 
could decisively melt in a single day of a bust.  
 
Microeconomic weaknesses of domestic banking and bad risk management 
hazardously reckless overexposure to single borrowers, connected lending, 
excessive maturity, currency and liquidity mismatches, high operational risk, 
prepayment risk as well as sloppy credit screening practice. Moreover, adverse 
selection proverbially happens in times of credit expansion, when banks do not 
have enough time, clear judgement (either fuelled by profit making greed or 
cornered by aggressive competition claiming its market share), personnel, nor 
information need for quick and proper credit analysis [Malovic, 2006]. However, 
it goes without saying that adverse loan applicants’ selection could and does take 
place during credit crunches as well [Ibidem]. Stylised facts depicting banking 
crises often enough indicates negative externalities arising from swiftly 
deteriorating balance sheets of the debtors to those of the banks. Following a 
negative shock originated anywhere across the asset markets, rising interest rates 
bite into firms' and households' balance sheets thereby crunching the asset value 
and lifting the bankruptcy rate. This obviously has a negative impact on banks' 
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equity value, artificially increases already stretched out leverage, produces a fall 
in lending activity and further increases the interest spreads [Reichlin, 2004]. 
Both Reichlin (2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) underline that such a 
negative capital spillover (effectively, a credit crunch and a near collapse of the 
credit channel) amidst recessions and banking crises is likely to be particularly 
acute for small and medium sized borrowers without established name 
recognition (and therefore less access to special tailor-made deals or bond and 
equity markets), since they disproportionately rely on bank lending which 
withdraws due to information asymmetry and SMEs' falling collateral value in 
secondary markets. Moreover, in such circumstances banks easily fall pray to 
moral hazard, either by management of big companies betting on their well-
known name and lucky star (e.g. WorldCom) or by rogue traders on their own 
payroll (e.g. Barings bank), trying to cover for the mounting losses from bad 
investment made in the credit-expansionary past [Malovic, 2006].  
 
Flawed legal, accounting and overall regulatory framework for bank supervision 
represents the last subset of banking crises determinants. This rather diverse set of 
determinants engulfs everything from degree of centralisation of the credit 
market, openness to international banking, through implementation and honouring 
of Basel prudential supervision regulations, deployment of IFRS and transparency 
of gathering and distributing financial information to central banks & national 
deposit insurance agencies or lack thereof, to the bad corporate governance in 
banks [EBRD-IFC, 2012] and coordination of banking sectors with the entire 
financial system by and large. Similarly, market participants themselves need 
better information on aggregate positions and linkages to appropriately monitor 
and price risks they expose themselves to. On-going initiatives that ought to help 
close data gaps include the G20 Data Gaps Initiative, which recommends the 
collection of consistent bank level data for joint analyses and enhancements to 
existing sets of statistics [Cerruti et alia, 2012]. Either way, there is by now an 
empirical consensus that -even aided with most standardized data bases- banks 
behave differently under different institutional settings [Haselmann-Wachtel, 
2010]. Thus, magic uni-sized solutions may not exist, but thought-trough 
international standards and the rule of law undoubtedly help banking sectors to 
remain solvent and stable in their crucially important financial intermediation 
function. As somebody once said, Stability may not be everything, but without 
stability, everything is nothing. 
 
Precisely while trying to honour prescriptions and avoid pitfalls of this last 
section, Balkan banking industry more or less invariably introduced fairly narrow 
banking as its business model. In the next section, we shall try to evaluate to what 
extent that was wise or sufficient to shield the banking sectors in the region from 
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the long-lasting recession and growing financial peril, pretty much imported from 
overseas.  
LIKELIHOOD AND FEASIBLE CHANNELS OF SYSTEMIC BANKING 
CRISIS IN THE BALKANS 
Against the background of costly state verification and information asymmetry 
characteristic of bankers [Freixas-Rochet, 2008], as well as panic-stricken fire 
sales of banks' assets they may be forced to by impatient herd behaviour of 
depositors [Reinhart-Rogoff, 2009], there may be some localised bank runs in the 
Balkans after all. In the end of the day, Freixas and Rochet (2008, pp.220-222) 
have demonstrated that fractional reserve banking system leads to an optimal 
allocation of resources only if patient consumers do not withdraw their deposits 
too soon, either due to opportunity costs and publicly unobservable liquidity 
preferences, or due to less than perfect coordination between depositors and 
multiplicity of equilibria under which a bad equilibrium behaves in accordance 
with the so-called Dornbush's law. In an attempt to overcome those instability 
problems Balkan banking sectors and their respective central banks (aided by 
political impediments to any serious financial market development in most of the 
countries under observation) followed a version of nilly-willy narrow banking 
principles. Narrow banking refers to a set of regulatory constraints on commercial 
banks' investment opportunities and lending rules that would make them systemic 
risk-free in almost any possible event [Freixas-Rochet, 2008]. While aware of the 
fact that there are many definitions of narrow banking out there [Kobayakawa-
Nakamura, 2000], [Kay, 2009], it is suffice for the purposes of this paper to 
realise that there's no evidence of excessive maturity transformation in Balkan 
banking industry, impressive reservations are earmarked for covering potentially 
contaminated assets, financial leverage is relatively modest, domestic currency 
loans are typically indexed to world currency dynamics (euro, swiss franc, dollar), 
and there's no drastic investment of deposit potential into shares, derivatives or 
alike risky assets. Furthermore, the overall level of dependence of -for example- 
ex Yugoslav nations outside E(M)U and of Albania on foreign lending is less than 
in EU10 banking sectors, because as a matter of fact most Balkan banks are 
increasingly reliant on domestic savings and demand deposit base [World Bank, 
2011], [Raiffeisen, 2012]. However, considering that not even time deposits 
qualify for certain hard core sources any more, Balkan banks could be left 
exposed if in such crisis (abnormal) times surges in deposit withdrawals outweigh 
the amount of liquidity kept in the till or short term, fungible and risk free 
securities.  
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Nonetheless, chances of such bank runs happening in Balkans are currently rather 
slim, owing to the fact that there's plenty of evidence to indicate that Balkan 
equivalent of „flight to quality“boils down to cash-hoarding tendencies 
throughout 2010-2012 time span. Moreover, although contrary to the recent 
commentaries, the extended Vienna Gentlemen's Agreement (also known as the 
European Banks' Coordination Initiative) thus far does not represent a credible 
(international) lender of last resort, since the so-called Vienna Plus initiative 
didn't slow down „coordinated deleveraging“ but in fact tacitly gave way to joint 
IFI public sector involvement [EBRD, 2012], resolute and preemptive raising of 
the deposit insurance bar in national banking sectors of the Balkans region made 
large scale runs and bank busts an additionally unlikely event. Even though 
credible deposit insurance schemes are capable of preventing deposit withdrawals 
en masse, i.e. along the lines of the Diamond-Dybvig script [Malovic, 2006], their 
model does not incorporate the fact that absent effective and efficient regulation 
(which, by the way, Kay (2009) strictly distinguishes from supervision), deposit 
insurance exhibits a tendency to induce banks to take excessive risk and engage in 
moral hazard kind of behaviour [Reinhart-Rogoff, 2009]. In our opinion, therein 
lies a profound advantage that Balkan strategy of narrow banking has had over the 
rest of Europe in the first waves of crises, anyway.  
 
Therefore, for the time being at least, likelihood for the outburst of a systemic 
banking crisis in the Balkans is rather low still. That is not to say that individual 
banks from the region cannot ever file for bankruptcy, nor that dark clouds aren’t 
gathering over Europe and hence, Balkans as well. Funding risks are returning to 
the region while dollarization and FX related credit risks never really left, former 
primarily driven by adverse developments in the Eurozone, latter due to NPL 
overhang and vanishing economic growth [The World Bank, 2011], [Cocozza et 
alia, 2011]. Although Balkan banking industry showed impressive resilience and 
(imposed) increase in self-sufficiency, direct cross-border lending remains a non-
negligible source of funding for the corporate sector, comprising around 15% of 
GDP. Deteriorating competitiveness, rising current account deficits and the 
rollover of maturing debt gave rise to large external financing needs, which in 
turn heighten these countries’ exposures to sudden stops and contagion [Cocozza 
et alia, 2011]. Vogel and Winkler (2011) use relatively simple econometric 
methodology to show that significant foreign bank presence did manage to 
initially stabilise cross-border loan flows but failed to stabilise domestic lending. 
Arguably, and especially since authors themselves admit that the two are closely 
linked together, this is just another way of saying that national banking sectors in 
the Balkans didn’t look upon the Vienna Agreement as longer term reliable or 
even firmly binding (there was very little new lending, cross border exposure was 
temporarily maintained and deleveraging was still going on but in a coordinated 
manner). Needless to say, that initially soft landing in terms of cross border loans 
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only eased up the pain from abrupt, almost overnight, retreat of portfolio 
investment and the mostly hard landing of FDI inflows. If that financing gap, 
particularly gasping in cases of Serbia and Bosnia, were not to be closed by either 
the IMF and/or diaspora involvement, any further deterioration of- or 
deleveraging pressures on locally represented foreign banks’ Western European 
headquarters could result in steeper rise of NPLs in the region. If, to the contrary, 
Eurozone crisis finally started to subside, there is empirical evidence that 
international banks could be more inclined to lend to countries in geographic 
proximity and with foreign subsidiaries which established a deep local presence 
[De Haas-Van Horen, 2011]. That is again hypothetical good news for the region. 
 
Summa summarum, out of four subsets of banking crises determinants identified 
in the literature, the latter two aren’t likely to be culprits or spreading channels of 
potentially systemic banking crisis in the Balkans. In fact, microeconomic 
management and prudential regulation could for its conservatism almost be 
proclaimed to be the strengths of the banking industry in the region. The former 
two subsets of determinants and contagion channels, namely macroeconomic 
volatility and to the extent capital flow bonanzas with now inevitable capital flow 
reversal bear relevance for the immediate outlook of the Balkan banking industry  
 
In regards to sudden stop phenomenon, it is now too late to warn about it and 
reasonably obvious how it works. Malovic (2008), for instance, warned about it 
ahead of time in extenso. In terms of the macroeconomic volatility, we would like 
to point at several aspects pertinent to Balkan banking industry’s constellation. 
First of all, although bank runs could be in principle averted by large and credible 
lender of last resort or deposit insurance scheme, domestic (especially populist) 
politicians may end up being more sympathetic towards bailing out domestic 
depositors and stake holders [Razin-Sadka, 2001]. In spite of finding that very 
unlikely, trouble is that if foreign creditors (direct through cross border loans or 
indirect through foreign banks) believed that to be a clear and present danger, in a 
sample of 42 episodes of banking crises Laeven and Valencia (2008) find that 
banks’ foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees! In 
that case, banking sectors with less foreign creditors might fare better than those 
with more foreign exposure. Second, banking sectors operating under the fixed or 
quasi-floating exchange rate may found themselves more vulnerable to 
unpredictable FX volatility and economic and balance sheet exposures to foreign 
exchange risk. On the other hand, continuous but persistent sliding of exchange 
rate in an original sin environment admittedly also compounds maturity mismatch 
with currency mismatch of both banks’ and their debtors’ balance sheets. With 
short-term liabilities of banks denominated in euros (foreign currency savings 
etc.), and long-term assets (banks’ loans) or, for that matter, banks’ obligants’ 
assets cum paychecks denominated in domestic currency, represent a pretty 
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combustible investment position. If contaminated claims forced liquidity 
problems and provoke some foreign currency deposit withdrawals that would 
certainly increase the pressures on already shaken value of national currency 
[Razin-Sadka, 2001]. Fine-tuned domestic macro-policy mix is required to avoid 
and nip into a bud the aforementioned self-fulfilling features of banking crises.  
 
Needless to say, more complex engagement in such controversies of open-
economy macroeconomics for small import-dependent countries indebted in 
foreign currency is beyond the scope of this chapter. Their governments are often 
hamstrung by conflicting loyalties to growth imperative versus fiscal 
consolidation, stability of narrowly constructed banking system and external 
competitiveness, economy’s solvency and true flexibility of exchange rate etc.  
 
Finally, following Wallace (1996), one might deduce that consciously committing 
an economy to the limits of narrow banking and conservatism of financial 
underdevelopment, indeed initially help insulate your banking sector from the 
recklessness of modern derivative, securitized finance, but eventually makes 
banking industry dependent of external liquidity injections and sort of deprives 
you from ability to finance economic growth and your own repayment capacity 
through less orthodox assets and liability relationships.  
CONCLUSION 
Motivation of this chapter has been to recapitulate the average anatomy of 
banking sectors in the selected countries in the Balkans (Southeast Europe), 
identify the impact and propagation channels of global financial crisis onto 
banking industry in the region, review the theoretical paradigms and empirical 
regularities of (international) banking crises literature and lastly, but not least, 
establish the likelihood, feasible channels and type of potentially systemic 
banking crisis in narrowly organised banking of the Balkans. 
 
To that end, we analysed the chief variables like deposit potential, credit activity, 
capital adequacy, NPLs and basic profitability indicators in the last couple of 
years immediately preceding and following the beginning of the crisis, we 
concluded that despite ever harsher impact of the global financial meltdown and 
ensuing recession on the region, Balkan banking industry proved to be 
significantly better capitalized, much more resilient and reasonably flexible as 
compared with the Eurozone’s banking sectors in weathering the first two waves 
of this modern economic nemesis.  
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At the time of this writing, Western European banking sectors are narrowly 
escaping systemic banking crises, while Balkan banking industry, shielded by its 
relatively conservative narrow banking model and underdeveloped financial 
markets, still stands firm albeit simultaneously stretched to the limits of the 
adopted banking model which is unable to provide organic growth of (securitized) 
credit potential or productively deploy some of its currently tied up liquidity. 
 
Therefore, for the time being at least, likelihood for the outburst of a systemic 
banking crisis in the Balkans is rather low still. That is not to say that individual 
banks from the region cannot ever file for bankruptcy, nor that dark clouds aren’t 
gathering over Europe and hence, Balkans as well. Both external and entirely 
domestic macroeconomic vulnerabilities very much lurk around the incoming 
bends, but their hypothetical impact on banking sectors of the region still remains 
but only one piece of the puzzle. Bigger picture is at stake here: within it, tackling 
the narrow banking model which took roots in the Balkans may not even be at the 
very top of the policy agenda. 
APPENDIX 
Table 1: Number of banks and domestic-to-foreign banks' assets ratio 
 
























asssets         
(%) 
Serbia 
Domestic 23 N.A 14 N.A 14 25.7 12 26.0 
Foreign  17 N.A 20 N.A 20 74.3 21 74.0 
Total  40 N.A 34 N.A 34 100.0 33 100.0 
Croatia 
Domestic  20 8.7 18 9.4 19 9.1 19 N.A 
Foreign  14 91.3 16 90.6 15 90.9 15 N.A 
Total  34 100.0 34 100.0 34 100.0 34 N.A 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Domestic  12 N.A 8 5.0 8 5.5 8 N.A 
Foreign  12 N.A 12 95.0 12 94.5 11 N.A 
Total  24 N.A 20 100.0 20 100.0 19 N.A 
Macedonia 
Domestic  12 56.3 4 41.0 4 39.0 N.A N.A 
Foreign  8 43.7 14 59.0 14 61.0 N.A N.A 
Total  20 100.0 18 100.0 18 100.0 N.A N.A 
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Romania 
Domestic  10 37.8 6 11.8 7 14.7 7 13.9 
Foreign  30 62.2 37 88.2 35 85.3 35 86.1 
Total 40 100.0 43 100.0 42 100.0 42 100.0 
 Source: Websites of selected central banks in Balkans 
 
 
Figure 1: Assets dynamics of selected banking sectors in Balkans (in mill. €) 
 
 
Source: Websites of selected central banks in Balkans 
  
Table 2: Structure of liabilities of selected banking sectors in Balkans, (in %) 
 
   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Serbia 
Liabilities 83.8 81.5 79.0 76.4 79.3 80.3 
Capital 16.2 18.5 21.0 23.6 20.7 19.7 
Montenegro 
Liabilities 84.7 89.6 92.0 91.6 89.0 89.4 
Capital 15.3 10.4 8.0 8.4 11.0 10.6 
Macedonia 
Liabilities 84.1 86.6 88.6 88.5 88.6 n.a 
Capital 15.9 13.4 11.4 11.5 11.4 n.a 
Romania 
Liabilities 87.8 88.2 90.1 89.3 87.9 86.3 
Capital 12.2 11.8 9.9 10.7 12.1 13.7 
Source: Websites of selected central banks in Balkans 
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Table 3: Cooke ratios (shareholders stake in risk weighted assets, in %)  
in the Balkans 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Serbia 26,0 24,7 27,9 21,9 21,3 19,9 19,7 
BiH 17,8 17,7 17,1 16,3 16,1 18,8 19,2 
Croatia 15,2 14,4 16,9 15,4 16,6 18,8 19,2 
Macedonia 21,3 18,3 17,0 16,2 16,4 16,1 16,8 
Montenegro 27,9 21,3 17,1 15,0 15,8 15,9 n.a 
Hungary n.a n.a 10,0 11,1 13,1 13,3 13,5 
Romania n.a n.a 13,8 13,8 14,7 15,0 14,5 
Source: Cocozza et alia (2011) 
 
Table 4: Credit and deposit potential of selected banking sectors in Balkans  
(in mill. €)  
 
































Serbia 5,769 7,281 10,098 12,262 13,139 4,656 7,085 10,301 10,019 11,440 
Croatia 21,409 26,353 30,320 34,499 35,745 23,027 27,319 31,454 33,412 34,742 
BiH 3,875 4,759 6,110 7,442 7,209 3,516 4,499 6,187 6,104 6,232 
Monte-
negro 375 847 2,245 2,797 2,397 487 1,075 2,091 1,990 1,824 
Romania 16,583 27,928 42,056 50,823 49,811 21,623 30,175 37,779 40,248 41,331 
Bulgaria 9,415 11,701 19,389 25,517 26,470 11,210 14,875 20,520 22,302 22,859 
Hungary 45,980 56,298 65,565 76,473 73,087 38,480 47,129 51,150 55,152 56,326 
Source: ECB (2010), Banking Structures, Annex; CB of Montenegro (2011), Statistical 
bulletin 
 
Table 5: Share of loans and deposits in GDP 
 
Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Serbia 29.3 29.3 34.8 39.9 44.2 23.6 28.5 35.5 32.6 38.5 
Croatia 59.7 67.6 70.7 73.8 78.4 64.2 70.1 73.3 71.5 76.2 
BiH 44.0 48.3 54.9 58.9 58.9 40.1 45.7 55.6 48.3 50.9 
Romania 20.7 26.8 35.9 38.7 41.0 25.9 28.0 32.4 31.2 36.8 
Bulgaria 41.4 44.8 67.1 75.2 79.2 59.4 67.2 68.7 62.5 65.4 
Hungary 44.8 48.6 53.4 60.8 60.8 39.3 40.9 42.3 44.1 45.7 
Source: Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (RZB Group) (2010), CEE Banking Sector 
Report 
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Figure 2: Total deposits (value in €, Sept. 2008=100) 
 
 
KOS- is Kosovo and Metohija*, Serbian province under UN (1244 Resolution) 
administration 
Source: The World Bank (2011) 
 
 











Source: Malecky and Podpiera (2010) 
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Table 7: Share of NPLs in total loans outstanding in Southeast Europe 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Serbia n.a n.a 11,3 11,3 15,7 16,9 18,8 
BiH 5,3 4,0 3,0 3,1 5,9 11,4 11,8 
Croatia 6,2 5,2 4,8 4,9 7,8 11,2 12,4 
Macedonia 15,0 11,2 7,5 6,7 8,9 9,0 n.a 
Montenegro 5,3 2,9 3,2 7,2 13,5 21,0 n.a 
Hungary n.a n.a 2,3 3,0 5,9 7,8 16,1 
Romania n.a n.a 1,7 2,8 7,9 11,9 14,1 
 Source: Cocozza et alia (2011), Raiffesisen (2012) 
 
 
Figure 3: NPL trends in selected Balkan banking sectors 
 
 
KOS- is Kosovo and Metohija*, Serbian province under UN (1244 Resolution) 
administration 
Source: The World Bank (2011) 
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KOS- is Kosovo and Metohija*, Serbian province under UN (1244 Resolution) 
administration 








Source: Raiffeisien (2012) 
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